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COMMENTS

RECOVERING NONPECUNIARY DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT UNDER LOUISIANA LAW

Under the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, the availability of nonpecuniary damages for breach of contract was a troublesome issue for
the Louisiana courts. Conflicting interpretations of the governing Civil
Code provisions, found in article 1934(3), prompted disarray, and even
after the Louisiana Supreme Court announced a controlling interpretation, inconsistencies and uncertainty persisted. Additionally, cases involving not only contractual, but also delictual fault raised even more
questions and produced even more discord. Against this backdrop of
unpredictability, the Louisiana Legislature revised the obligations provisions of the Civil Code and eliminated the ambiguities inherent in the
prior article. Thus, the confusion resulting from the conflicting interpretations of the earlier scheme should have been remedied. This article
will examine the law prior to the revision, and the changes effected
therein. Additionally, problems with respect to the disparity between
delictual and contractual actions for the recovery of nonpecuniary damages will be discussed.
Meador and its Progeny
Prior to the revision, the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed the
myriad interpretations' given to former article 1934(3) in Meador v.
Toyota of Jefferson, Inc. 2 Although much of the court's analysis in
Meador is supported by the terms and history of the article, the court
drew a distinction between intellectual and physical gratification that is
not. This latter aspect of Meador produced subsequent inconsistencies
in the contractual realm of nonpecuniary damage recovery.
In Meador, a young girl sought recovery for nonpecuniary damages
caused by a seven month delay in the repair of her first automobile.

Copyright 1987, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. See Comment, Damages Ex Contractu: Recovery of Nonpecuniary Damages for
Breach of Contract under Louisiana Civil Code Article 1934, 48 Tul. L. Rev. 1160 (1974),
which reviews the strict, broad, and liberal lines of interpretation.
2. 332 So. 2d 433 (La. 1976).
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The court phrased the issue in the following way: "May an automobile
owner recover damages for aggravation, distress, and inconvenience from
a repairman who has unnecessarily and excessively delayed completion
of the vehicle's repair?" ' The court looked to article 1934(3) which
read:
Where the contract has for its object the gratification of some
intellectual enjoyment, whether in religion, morality or taste, or
some convenience or other legal gratification, although these are
not appreciated in money by the parties, yet damages are due
for their breach; a contract for a religious or charitable foundation, a promise of marriage, or an engagement for a work
4
of some of the fine arts, are objects and examples of this rule.
The analysis called for by this article is one which focuses on the
cause of the contract; the availability of recovery turned on whether
the cause was one of intellectual enjoyment. According to the majority
opinion, this meant that, "where an object, or the exclusive object, of
a contract, is physical gratification (or anything other than intellectual
gratification) nonpecuniary damages as a consequence of nonfulfillment
of that object are not recoverable." ' The court found the principal
object of the contract to be the Toyota's repair and concluded that any
"intellectual enjoyment" the plaintiff sought to sustain under the con6
tract was at most an "incidental . . . contemplation of the . . . parties."
On this basis, the court denied recovery.
The supreme court's definition of "intellectual enjoyment" as being
distinct from "physical gratification" may be criticized on several grounds.
First, although the modern day meaning of "intellectual" contemplates
mental, as opposed to emotional, faculties, at the time of the promulgation of the original version of article 1934(3), "intellectual" had a
much broader meaning: "the appreciation of values other than economic. ' Furthermore, that article drew no distinction between intellectual and physical enjoyment; instead, it spoke of objects "not
appreciated in money," 8 and of objects of "some convenience. ' 9 The

3. Id. at 433-34.
4. La. Civ. Code art. 1934 (1870).
5. 332 So. 2d at 437. The court aligned itself with a broad interpretation found in
one line of jurisprudence that did not require the object to be exclusively intellectual.
For other interpretations, see Litvinoff, Moral Damages, 38 La. L. Rev. 1 (1977); Note,
Nonpecuniary Damages in Breach of Contract: Louisiana Civil Code Article 1934, 37 La.
L. Rev. 625 (1977); Comment, Damages Ex Contractu: Recovery of Nonpecuniary Damages
for Breach of Contract Under Louisiana Civil Code Article 1934, 48 Tul. L. Rev. 1160
(1970).
6. 332 So. 2d at 437.
7. Litvinoff, Moral Damages, 38 La. L. Rev. 1, 9 n.40 (1977).
8. La. Civ. Code art. 1934(3) (1870).
9. Id.
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history of the latter term further supports the contention that the meaning
of "intellectual" was not entirely devoid of concepts and values which
have physical qualities. "Some convenience" is a mistranslation of the
French term "commodite," which more properly translates to "personal
comfort."' 0 Undeniably, an important aspect of "comfort" is physical
satisfaction. Finally, it is possible that the court's intellectual-physical
dichotomy was influenced by article 1934(3)'s illustrative examples: "a
contract for a religious or charitable foundation, a promise of marriage,
or an engagement for a work of some of the fine arts."" As the history
of article 1934(3) reflects, however, these examples were not intended
to support the narrow construction of the phrase "intellectual enjoyment" imposed by the court.
The distinction drawn between intellectual and physical enjoyment
did not only lack support from the legislative history; it also proved
too abstract to apply with consistency. A review of some of the decisions
which followed Meador emphasizes the elusiveness of the supreme court's
test and the need for the legislative revision which ultimately occurred.
In three of the decisions which are reviewed below, courts facing substantially similar factual scenarios used different analyses to reach three
different conclusions. Two of the courts failed to analyze the cause of
the contracts at issue completely, while another summarily distinguished
Meador as providing absolutely no framework of analysis.
In Whitener v. Clark, 2 a contractor breached the implied obligation
of good workmanlike performance in a contract to build a "distinctively
planned residence" through delays, deviations from the specifications,
and defective construction. 3 The second circuit awarded nonpecupaiary
damages to the homeowner for mental anguish caused by the disappointment of the dream of owning a beautiful home. The court was
not only confronted with Meador, but also Catalanotto v. Hebert, 4 in
which the fourth circuit had held that a building contract without more
does not fit the category of objects the deprivation of which supports
recovery for mental distress. 5 The facts of Catalanottoinvolved similar
delays and defects as those found in Whitener. The court considered,
but dismissed Catalanotto, announcing simply that the "second circuit
differs with the fourth.' 6 To satisfy Meador, the court abruptly held

10. See La. Civ. Code art. 1928 (1825) and Harrap's New Standard French and
English Dictionary C-69 (1972). See also Free v. Franklin Guest Home, 463 So. 2d 865
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1985), citing Litvinoff, supra note 7, at 8.
11. La. Civ. Code art. 1934(3) (1870).
12. 356 So. 2d 1094 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 So. 2d 638 (La. 1978),
358 So. 2d 641 (La. 1978).
13. Id.at 1098.
14. 347 So. 2d 301 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1977).
15. Id.at 303.
16. 356 So. 2d at 1098.
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the contract before it "greatly different" from the repair contract in
Meador.17 This terse announcement, although perhaps correct, provided
no insight with respect to when the principal object of a contract is
the intellectual enjoyment of the obligee.
Later, in Ostrowe v. Darensbourg,8 the Louisiana Supreme Court
was presented with a building contract which, like those in Whitener
and Catalanotto, was for a house of distinctive design. The court held
that the unique attributes of the home did not make the contract's
object one of intellectual gratification, finding that even if intellectual
enjoyment was a purpose of the home building contract, it was not the
principal object. The principal object, according to the court, was the
physical gratification received by having a place for living, shelter and
comfort. The dissent in Ostrowe, written by Justice Calogero (author
of the majority opinion in Meador), emphasized the lack of opportunity
given to the plaintiffs to prove whether the principal object was in fact
one of intellectual enjoyment. 9 The majority based its decision solely
on the classification of the contract as one to build a home. 20 Such an
analysis was not nearly as extensive as Meador seemed to require.2
The fundamental objection raised in this comment to the analysis
established by the supreme court in Meador relates to a very specific
aspect of that analysis-the interpretation of the term "intellectual enjoyment." From a general standpoint, however, the court proceeded
correctly, in that it employed a cause-based analysis as required by
article 1934(3). Nevertheless, the three cases just discussed represent a
detraction from the cause-based analysis, which may be attributed to
the difficulties inherent in applying Meador's intellectual-physical framework.
Other Louisiana cases decided after Meador illustrate how the intellectual-physical distinction engendered a lack of proper concern for,
and analysis of, the cause of contracts in actions for nonpecuniary
damages. For example, in allowing a homeowner nonpecuniary damages
from a carpet retailer, the third circuit stated that the nature of the
loss was controlling. 22 Since the discoloration complained of did not
affect the carpet's utility (a physical quality), the loss was characterized
as intellectual. The court could easily have justified recovery on the
basis of frustration of cause, since the carpet retailer knew that this
homeowner/interior decorator was especially concerned with his home's

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
1983).

Id.
377 So. 2d 1201 (La. 1979).
Id. at 1204 (Calogero, J., dissenting).
Id.at 1203.
332 So. 2d at 437.
McManus v. Galaxy Carpet Mills, Inc., 433 So. 2d 854, 858 (La. App. 3d Cir.

1987]

COMMENTS

decor. In another case, the second circuit denied nonpecuniary damages
2a
for breach of a contract to stabilize the foundation of a house. The
court announced that a contract for the repair of an already defective
thing does not support compensation for nonpecuniary losses.2 As in
Ostrowe and Catalanotto, the court saw fit to take a "labelling-of-thecontract" approach, in complete disregard of the requirement of employing
a cause-based analysis.
Even in cases employing a cause-based analysis, unwarranted distinctions have surfaced. For example, in B & B Cut Stone Co. v.
Resneck, 25 a wealthy couple contracted to have a massive marble fireplace
installed in their bedroom. The court found an "intellectual artistic
objective" in the contract, noting that the marble was chosen for its
beauty and as a reflection of a particular housewide motif. 26 Aesthetics
were clearly a cause of the contract. In an effort to insure satisfaction
of Meador, however, the Resneck court distinguished this expensive,
elegant, and massive fireplace from the "proletarian ' 27 Toyota in Meador. The term "intellectual" is no more synonymous with "elegance"
or "expense" than the term "physical" is with "proletarian." Expense
and elegance, although perhaps indicative of a nonpecuniary interest,
are not exclusively determinative of such an interest.
In sum, Meador spawned a vast amount of uncertainty. Subsequent
cases drew improper distinctions, utilized conclusory and unilluminating
methods of analysis, and often eschewed the causal emphasis of the
codal scheme. Unfortunately, Meador was not the only catalyst of the
confusion over the availability of damages for nonpecuniary loss. As
much, if not more, chaos resulted from the disparity between tort and
contract theories of recovering nonpecuniary losses.
Disparity Between Delictual and Contractual Actions
Perhaps anxious to find a legal basis to support awards for nonpecuniary loss, Louisiana courts have often used tort, rather than contract, theories of recovery. To further complicate matters, the terms
used to describe the various degrees of delictual fault have often also
been used to describe contractual fault. To understand the dichotomy
between recovery under the law of torts and recovery under the law of

23. Seymore v. Louisiana Soil Stabilization Co., 381 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1980).
24. Id. at 573.
25. 465 So. 2d 851 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
26. Id. at 859. Compare Martin v. AAA Brick Co., 386 So. 2d 987 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1980), denying a nonpecuniary claim for breach of a fireplace construction contract
since evidence did not show that the contract had intellectual enjoyment as its principal
object.
27. Resneck, 465 So. 2d at 859, n.6.
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contracts, two distinct concepts must be recognized: delictual fault is
the intentional or negligent causing of damages, while contractual fault
is the mere avoidance of a conventional obligation. 2s The difference
between tort and contract principles of recovery emerges when one
analyzes cases which find delictual fault for acts of negligence, for
intentional infliction of harm, and under strict liability, when a contractual relationship exists between the parties.
The mere existence of a contract between parties does not bar an
action in tort for damages arising from their contractual relationship.
Indeed, a contractual obligee may have two separate actions against his
obligor. For example, in Franklin v. Able Moving & Storage, Co.,29 a
contract called for an estimated four hour in-town move of household
furnishings. The moving company breached this contract by taking seventeen hours, stretched over two days, to complete the job. In addition,
through negligent handling, the company damaged the furniture. Thus,
the obligee had available two distinct actions against the obligor: one
in contract for the delay, and another in tort for the physical damage.
The court clearly recognized the independent bases of recovery, and
awarded nonpecuniary damages only for the tortious damaging of the
furniture. Other Louisiana courts, however, have been less successful in
keeping the bases of recovery separated.
For example, the court in Pike v. Stevens Imports, Inc3 0 awarded
damages for nonpecuniary loss based on the "negligent breach" of a
contract to repair a Mercedes-Benz. The defendant had excessively delayed performance of the repair contract by waiting eighteen months
before undertaking the work. The court's resort to a delictual basis of
recovery was clearly motivated by the similarity of the facts to, and
the holding of, Meador. Finding a "negligent breach," however, does
not necessarily support a finding of delictual fault. Many breaches of
contract result from what may be characterized as a "contractual negligence": the obligor fails to perform either because he is incapable of
doing so at all, or because he merely fails to perform on par with his
capabilities. Nevertheless, some act beyond a mere failure to render the
promised performance is required to find delictual fault, because otherwise, every breach of contract would be delictual.
These cases illustrate that recovery for delictual and contractual fault
can and should be distinguished. Such a distinction is not as easily

28. 2 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 184, at 347, in 7 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1975).
29. 439 So. 2d 489 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
30. 448 So. 2d 738 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984). See also Childers v. Davis, 444 So.
2d 692 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984); Coddington v. Stephens Imports, Inc., 383 So. 2d 416
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1980); Patton v. Precision Motors, Inc., 352 So. 2d 341 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1977).
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discerned, however, when recovery is sought -on the basis of the breach
of the implied warranties which are operative under certain contracts.
The reason for ambiguity in this area is that such a breach effectively
results in the strict liability of the party owing the warranty. The term
"strict liability," however, has connotations of delictual fault. Nevertheless, the strict liability of implied warranties arises out of contract
law; therefore, recovery should be governed by the articles of the Civil
Code controlling contractual damages. 3 Louisiana courts, however, have
not always seen it this way.
The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Gele v. Markey 2 demonstrates the tendency of the Louisiana jurisprudence to obscure the
difference between contractual and delictual fault in the area of implied
contractual warranties. In Gele, the plaintiffs leased a building from
the defendant for the operation of a grocery store. When a defective
ceiling collapsed, the plaintiffs' equipment and merchandise was so damaged that they had to close down their business permanently. The trial
court found the defendant liable under Civil Code article 2695 and
awarded the plaintiffs both pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages. Article
2695 provides:
The lessor guarantees the lessee against all the vices and defects
of the thing, which may prevent its being used even in case it
should appear he knew nothing of the existence of such vices
and defects, at the time the lease was made, and even if they
have arisen since, provided they do not arise from the fault of
the lessee; and if any loss should result to the lessee from the
vices and defects, the lessor shall be bound to indemnify him
for the same.
The court of appeal agreed that the defendant-lessor was liable under
article 2695, but, applying article 1934(3) as interpreted in Meador,
reversed the lower court's award of nonpecuniary damages. 33 The sole
issue before the supreme court was the availability of nonpecuniary
damages.
The supreme court affirmed the denial of nonpecuniary damages on
the basis that no nonpecuniary loss had been proven.3 4 In so holding,
however, the court indicated that proof of a deprivation of "intellectual
enjoyment" was not the only method available to the plaintiffs to support
a claim for damages based on mental distress. According to the court,
the plaintiffs could have recovered upon a showing of either "real,
substantial emotional distress, or loss of intellectual enjoyment because

31.
32.
33.
34.

La.
387
379
387

Civ.
So.
So.
So.

Code arts. 1994-2012.
2d 1162 (La. 1980).
2d 763, 764 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
2d at 1163, 1164.
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of the ceiling's collapse."" The court also stated that: "the application
of the Meador interpretation of Article 1934(3) to this case seems to
work real injustice, if the Geles suffered real, substantial emotional
distress or loss of intellectual enjoyment because of the violation of the

lessor's obligation.'

'36

The problem with the court's analysis is that it strongly implied the
availability of noncontractual damages when the only duty that was
identified as having been breached was the warranty owed under the
contract of lease. Although it is not altogether clear from the opinion,
the court indicated that it found a delictual element in the violation of
article 2695, which, and this is again not altogether clear, it derived
from the strict liability imposed by that article.
It is perfectly reasonable to characterize the liability imposed under
article 2695 as strict, for the lessor owes the duty regardless of the
reasonableness of his actions. What is not reasonable is the conclusion
that, because that liability is "strict," it is also delictual. Every contract
breach arguably results in a form of strict liability, since the obligor
need only establish the contract's existence, its nonperformance, and the
ensuing damages. The sole purpose of strict liability in warranty actions
is to relieve the plaintiff from the problems of proof inherent in pursuing
warranty remedies for damages from hidden defects.3 7 What is most
important to recognize is that the breach of warranty action arises out
of the lease contract. Recovery is still controlled by the articles governing
contractual damages. For the court to suggest otherwise, without identifying the breach of some noncontractual duty, was error.
That the court in Gele seemed inclined to classify the strict liability
imposed by article 2695 as delictual is not surprising in light of the role
of strict liability in redhibition actions brought against manufacturers.
As with the enhancement of the lessor's contractual obligations through
article 2695, article 2520 enhances the seller's obligations through the
warranty against hidden defects in things sold. When the vendor knows
of the hidden defect, "the vendor's act of delivering a defective thing
... amounts to fraud and, besides the contractual, gives rise to a
delictual liability.''38 This knowledge has been imputed to manufacturers
since the recognition by Louisiana courts of strict liability for defective
products.39 The intermixing of tort and contract in redhibition actions

35.
36.
37.
denied,
38.
(1975).
39.

Id. at 1164 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1163 (emphasis added).
See DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest Ins. Co., 403 So. 2d 26 (La. 1981), cert.
459 U.S. 836, 103 S. Ct. 82 (1982); Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975).
2 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 252, at 477, in 7 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 754 (La. 1971).
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against manufacturers has since rendered the two theories of liability
virtually indistinguishable. 4
Courts have imposed delictual fault for a breach of warranty based
on imputed knowledge of defects in order to equalize the positions of
purchasers and third parties. Whereas third parties with no privity of
contract with the manufacturer would have an easy route of recovery
on the basis of strict products liability and the imputed knowledge
doctrine, purchasers might have been disinclined to pursue redhibition
remedies without the benefit of imputed knowledge. Furthermore, purchasers would otherwise have had to satisfy the requirements of article
1934(3) before recovering nonpecuniary damages, while third parties
could recover in tort upon a showing of only foreseeability of nonpecuniary harm.
The supreme court seemed to close whatever chasm existed between
the tort and contract bases for redhibition actions in Philippe v. Browning Arms Co." In this case, Dr. Philippe sued a manufacturer under
a strict products liability theory after shooting his finger off with a
defective gun. The court awarded nonpecuniary damages under the delictual theory of strict products liability, 42 and attorney's fees pursuant
to Civil Code article 2545, which permits such recovery against sellers
in bad faith. The imputed knowledge doctrine of strict products liability
placed the defendant manufacturer in bad faith even though the plaintiff
did not specifically plead redhibition. The court deemed redhibition to
have, and treated it as having, both contractual and tortious overtones.
Recently, the Louisiana Supreme Court in LaFleur v. John Deere
Co. 43 provided a possible limitation on the intermixing of tort and
contract as theories underlying actions in redhibition. In this case, two
farmers sued the seller and manufacturer of a grain drill which failed
to plant seeds at the desired depth, thus causing the intended crops to
fail. Fontenot, the plaintiff who purchased the drill, was planting the
first crop on his newly acquired farm, as well as the crop of Lafleur,

40. When the seller is in good faith, there is no delictual element to his responsibility
for selling a redhibitory thing. Indeed, damages may not be recovered from a good faith
seller in an action in redhibition, as the Civil Code only obligates him to return the
purchase price and any "expenses occasioned by the sale." See La. Civ. Code art. 2531.
41. 395 So. 2d 310 (La. 1980).
42. See also Bourne v. Rein Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 463 So. 2d 1356 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 468 So. 2d 570 (La. 1985); Hubbard v. General Motors
Corp., 438 So. 2d 671 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983). Compare the following which denied
nonpecuniary damage recovery for failure to satisfy Meador: Paul v. Ford Motor Co.,
392 So. 2d 704 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980); Muller v. Durnin Chrysler-Plymouth, 361 So.
2d 1257 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 363 So. 2d 915 (La. 1978); Burns v. LamarLane Chevrolet, Inc., 354 So. 2d 620 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977); Stratton-Baldwin, Inc.
v. Brown Carpets, 343 So. 2d 292 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
43. 491 So. 2d 624 (La. 1986).
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the other plaintiff, who had loaned Fontenot money to get Fontenot
started as a farmer.
The court found the product was redhibitorily defective, i.e., so
useless that the purchaser would not have bought it had he known of
the vice. 4 The court also found, however, that recovery under strict
products liability was unavailable, since the defect did not make the
product unreasonably unsafe, and since the plaintiffs only suffered economic, and not personal, injuries. The facts thus presented the court
with the opportunity to disassociate delictual fault from an action in
redhibition brought purely because a product is useless. Nevertheless,
the court expressly declined to take advantage of this opportunity.
Furthermore, although Lafleur, who was not the purchaser of the grain
drill, was permitted to recover for the economic damages he suffered
due to his failed crop, the court failed to identify the basis for that
recovery. On the one hand, the court did not find grounds for products
liability; on the other, Lafleur had no standing to bring an action in
redhibition. In the end, although it seems that the court may have taken
a step toward making distinct the tort and contract underpinnings of
the action in redhibition, that step was a short one.
Lafleur is significant not only for its treatment (or nontreatment)
of the legal theories underlying the action in redhibition, but also because
it expressly addressed both the revised Civil Code provisions regarding
nonpecuniary damages and the rule of Meador. Having examined the
interpretational problems which were experienced in applying article
1934(3) of the Code of 1870, as well as the additional complications
engendered by the utilization of tort theories to support the award of
nonpecuniary damages, the effect of the revision of 1984 will now be
considered.
The Revision and Its Aftermath
In 1984, the Louisiana Legislature revised the obligations articles of
the Civil Code, and in doing so replaced article 1934(3) with article
1998. Article 1998 provides:
Damages for nonpecuniary loss may be recovered when the
contract, because of its nature, is intended to gratify a nonpecuniary interest and, because of the circumstances surrounding
the formation or the nonperformance of the contract, the obligor
knew, or should have known, that his failure to perform would
45
cause that kind of loss.

44.
45.

La. Civ. Code art. 2520.
La. Civ. Code art. 1998.
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Thus, nonpecuniary loss may not be recovered for breach of contract
unless the contract is intended to gratify a "nonpecuniary interest."
This straightforward approach eliminates the ambiguities inherent in
"intellectual enjpyment," as found in former article 1934(3), and thereby
removes the source of conflicting interpretations. Close analysis of article
1998 reveals that some, but not all of Meador remains good law. The
article's emphasis on the nature of the contract parallels the causal
approach in Meador. Article 1998 also retains the distinction recognized
in Meador between contractual and delictual actions for nonpecuniary
damages. The Meador dichotomy of intellectual and physical gratification, however, appears to vanish in light of the newly promulgated
distinction between nonpecuniary and pecuniary interests.
No court has been required to render a decision on the basis of
the revised article; however, as previously mentioned, the Louisiana
Supreme Court did recently address the revision, as well as the status
of Meador, in LaFleur v. John Deere Co. 46 In Lafleur, the buyer of a
farm implement sued both the manufacturer and retailer for losses
incurred as a result of the equipment's failure. 47 The purchaser sought
nonpecuniary damages due to the devastating crop loss which he suffered.
Although the plaintiff's lack of proof prevented his recovering for mental
anguish under any theory, and although the case arose prior to the
revision, Justice Calogero (author of Meador), writing for the majority,
took cognizance of article 1998. By finding the substitution of the term
"nonpecuniary interest ' 48 for "the gratification of some intellectual
enjoyment ' 49 to be inconsequential, the court determined that the revision merely "makefs] more certain under the law the Meador
resolution" 50 that "nonpecuniary damages are recoverable only where
the contract has for its object gratification of intellectual enjoyment."',
The court's rationale warrants criticism for two reasons. First, it fails
to appreciate the meaning rightfully due "nonpecuniary interests" in
light of the term's literal definition and historical context. Second, the
court mistakenly found that the rejection of the original version of
article 1998 supported its conclusion.
Article 1998 requires that the parties, through their contract, intend
gratification of a nonpecuniary interest for there to be recovery for
nonpecuniary losses. Webster's defines "pecuniary" as "consisting of

46. 491 So. 2d 624 (La. 1986).
47. As noted, a third party, Lafleur, also sued. His action is irrelevant for present
purposes.
48. La. Civ. Code art. 1998.
49. La. Civ. Code art. 1934 (1870).
50. LaFleur, 491 So. 2d at 629.
51. Id.
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or measured in money." '5 2 Thus, nonpecuniary interests are those not
measured in money, i.e., those without readily ascertainable market
values. Article 1998 revives the true meaning of the term "intellectual"
intended by the redactors of prior article 1934(3). The term "intellectual"
encompassed a broad range of noneconomic values which pertained to
much more than the faculties of the mind. Article 1934(3) itself addressed
objects "not appreciated in money." The revision, therefore, aligns itself
with the intent of the redactors of article 1934(3) and rejects Meador's
distinction between intellectual and physical gratification.
The term "nonpecuniary interests" depicts a much broader realm
of protected interests than did the term "intellectual enjoyment" as
interpreted by the court in Meador. A cause of a purely physical nature
may now support nonpecuniary damage recovery. For example, a bridegroom who gets outfitted for his wedding by a tailor has a clear interest
in his appearance on the fateful day. This interest, although it necessarily
relates to a physical concern, is nonetheless nonpecuniary. The elimination of the narrowly drawn examples of article 1934(3) further evidences an intent to protect a wider range of interests than that protected
by earlier interpretations of article 1934(3).
The LaFleur court's resuscitation of Meador erroneously rests in
part on the rejection by the legislature of the original version of article
1998. That version premised recovery of nonpecuniary losses either on
the nature of the contract or the circumstances surrounding its breach.
Under the scheme adopted by the Louisiana Legislature, the contract's
cause and the circumstances surrounding either the contract's breach or
its formation govern the issue's resolution. The use of the conjunctive
in the adopted version of article 1998, as opposed to the disjunctive in
the original version, hardly supports the continued viability of the Meador distinction between intellectual and physical enjoyment. The adopted
version, by emphasizing both the cause of the contract and the obligor's
actual or constructive knowledge of the ensuing nonpecuniary loss, merely
insures that the key to recovery of nonpecuniary loss is "contractual"
foreseeability.
A Cause-Based Analysis
Since article 1998 specifically requires analysis of the nature of the
contract, a determination of the cause of the contract is necessary. A
noted authority defines cause as the end men seek to attain by contracting, and notes further that "this end varies with the nature of the
contract. '53 The legislative history of article 1934(3) and Meador are

52.
53.
(1969).

Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 866 (1983).
1 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 217, at 388, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
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both consistent with the focus of article 1998 on the cause of the contract
at issue. Although article 1934(3) required the contract's "object" to

be intellectual enjoyment, courts correctly have used cause as the key
to nonpecuniary damage recovery. Meador utilized cause by focusing
on the "overriding concern of [the] plaintiff, evident to [the] defendant
at the time [of the contract]. '5 4 Other courts have rightly looked to the
"purpose," 55 "reason," 56 "motivating factor," 57 and "cause" 58 of the

contract. The term "object"

is a mistranslation of the term "but" in

the French text of the Civil Code of 1825.1 9 "But" properly translates
to "end," "purpose," or "motive, ' '6° the same terms used to define
",cause.",61

The cause of a contract may be apparent from the contract itself,
whether by implication or by express statement in the contract. In other

situations, the, circumstances surrounding the contract's formation may
indicate the parties' intent. Thus, the particular facts and circumstances
of each case determine the cause of each contract. Proper analysis looks

beyond the type of contract involved and takes into account the fact
that personal motives may enter the objective realm of contracts. Many
post-Meador decisions used a cause-based analysis in applying article
1934(3); to this extent, those cases remain relevant to the application
of article 1998.
Free v. Franklin Guest Home, Inc.62 provides an example of a
contract which clearly delineated the interests-of the parties. This case

involved a claim by a resident of a nursing home for nonpecuniary
damages. The contract contained a "Patient's Rights" clause which listed

patient dignity as one of those rights. From this provision the court

54. 332 So. 2d at 437.
55. Schroeder v. DiPascal Cabinet Co., 467 So. 2d 1380 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985);
Smith v. Andrepont, 378 So. 2d 479 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979), cert denied, 380 So. 2d
102 (La. 1980); Plaisance v. Dutton, 336 So. 2d 1034 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
56. Robertson v. Jimmy Walker Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 368 So. 2d 747, 755 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 So. 2d 833 (La. 1979), 371 So. 2d 834 (La. 1979).
57. Ostrowe v. Darensbourg, 369 So. 2d 1156-58 (La. App. 1st Cir.), aff'd, 377 So.
2d 1201 (La. 1979).
58. Riche v. Krestview Mobile Homes, Inc., 375 So. 2d 133, 138 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1979).
59. The French version read: "Lorsque le contrat a pour but de procurer a quelqu'un
une jouissance purement intellectuelle, telle que celles qui tiennent a la religion, a la
morale, au gout, a la commodite ou a toute autre espece de satisfaction de ce genre
60. Harrap's New Standard French and English Dictionary B-51 (1972). See also
Note, supra note 5, at 630.
61. La. Civ. Code art. 1967, replacing La. Civil Code art. 1896 (1870). See also, 1
S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 240, at 435, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1969); 3 C.
Toullier, Le Droit Civil Francais, Tit. III, 1166, at 377 (1833).
62. 463 So. 2d 864 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
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found that the resident had contracted for overall well-being as well as
for physical gratification. In the sense of the patient's well-being and
personal comfort, the principal object of the contract was intellectual
enjoyment. Where a contract does not expressly declare all of the parties'
motives, the court must look to the communicated intentions of the
parties to ascertain the cause of the contract.
Although "anything not known or not intended by both parties
remains outside of the contractual field," 63 personal motives become
constituent parts of contracts when they are communicated. In Vick v.
National Airlines, Inc.,64 the plaintiff contracted with the defendant to
fly to Miami where he was to join his wife; the couple was then scheduled
on a Caribbean flight for a sun-filled vacation. The airline failed to
inform Mr. Vick that severe weather stretched across the initial flight
path. This weather caused an extra stop, delaying Mr. Vick's Miami
arrival, and ultimately prevented timely connection with the Caribbean
flight. The fourth circuit held that since the airline knew of the Vicks'
vacation plans, the principal object of the contract was intellectual
enjoyment. When, however, a personal motive is not made known to
the obligor, that motive remains outside of the contract absent an
external circumstance indicative of such a motive.
For example, in Bowes v. Fox-Stanley Photo Products" a wine
connoisseur was unable to recover damages for mental distress resulting
from the defendant's improper processing of vacation pictures from
French vineyards. The fourth circuit denied the plaintiff's claim, stating
that plaintiff's failure to inform the processor of the "nature" of the
film made physical gratification, the actual processing, the contract's
principal object. The court limited recovery to the price of the film's
replacement.
A particular contract may, by implication, support a finding of a
nonpecuniary cause. For example, in the purchase of a family car, not
only is a mode of transportation sought, but other conveniences are
expected as well. 66 When carpet is selected to match a home's decor,
appearances are by implication a part of the contract's cause. 67 A contract
for the refinishing of kitchen cabinet doors has beautification as its
purpose, as apparent from the contract itself. 68 All of these examples
indicate that it is largely a question of fact as to whether nonpecuniary
interests were intended to be gratified through the performance of the
obligation.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

1 S.Litvinoff, Obligations §220, at 395, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1969).
409 So. 2d 383 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
379 So. 2d 844 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
For an interesting discussion of this example see Litvinoff, supra note 5, at 17.
McManus v. Galaxy Carpet Mills, Inc., 433 So. 2d 854 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
Schroeder v. DiPascal Cabinet Co., 467 So. 2d 1380 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985).
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The Role of Foreseeability; Another Look at Delictual Fault
Every nonperformance may fairly be expected to result in some
degree of nonpecuniary frustration. As noted in LaFleur, foreseeability
alone is not the test for recovery. Under article 1998, breach of a
contract may result in recovery of nonpecuniary damages only if such
damages were foreseeable and the cause was the promotion of a nonpecuniary interest. 69 There certainly may be some overlap in these two
inquiries. If the gratification of the obligee's nonpecuniary interest is
the cause of the contract, and the obligor is aware that it is the cause,
then it is foreseeable that the failure to perform as promised will result
in nonpecuniary loss. Mere foreseeability of nonpecuniary damage, however, does not make the cause a nonpecuniary interest.
This notion of foreseeability plays an important role in the disparity
recognized by many to exist between contractual and delictual fault in
the realm of nonpecuniary damages. Concern over this absence of symmetry was eloquently expressed by Justice Dixon in his dissenting opinion
in Meador: "We should not deny recovery for damages which are
suffered, for which justice requires compensation, for the rather superficial reason that plaintiff's action is in contract, not tort." ' 7 Even the
majority in Meador lamented that "[pierhaps it would be better if
damages for mental anguish in breach of contract cases were allowable
just as in tort actions."' 71 Nevertheless, the majority concluded that "such
72
a matter directs itself to the lawmaker."
The legislature did address the issue; article 1998 is evidence of that.
An understanding of the policies underlying contract and tort theories
helps to explain why the revision requires more than mere foreseeability
for contractual nonpecuniary damage recovery. Foreseeability in tort
actions is determined by a duty-risk analysis: whether damages are
recoverable depends on the tortfeasor's having foreseen this injury to
this plaintiff occurring in this manner. 71 In answering this question,
courts balance policies of fairness, deterrence, and judicial efficiency.
By limiting recovery of nonpecuniary damage to contracts intended
to gratify nonpecuniary interests, the legislature has, to a certain extent,
served each of these policies. At the heart of every contract is the
consent of the parties, an accord of the wills. 74 Unlike the "relationship"

69. La. Civ. Code art. 1998 (1985).
70. 332 So. 2d at 438 (Dixon, C.J., dissenting).
71. 332 So. 2d at 438.
72. Id.
73. Crowe, Anatomy of a Tort-Greenian, As Interpreted by Crowe Who Has Been
Influenced by Malone-A Primer, 22 Loy. L. Rev. 903 (1976).
74. 1 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 240, at 435, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1969).
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between parties resulting from a delict, parties to a contract agree to
their respective rights and obligations, and can predetermine the costs
of the relationship. If an obligee intends to have a nonpecuniary interest
satisfied, he will pay a higher price than the obligor may otherwise
demand in light of the potential liability for nonpecuniary damages. By
eliminating nonpecuniary liability in instances where the parties did not
intend to facilitate nonpecuniary interests, the legislature has removed
a potential source of exorbitant consumer prices. Under traditional contract theory, "anything not known nor intended by the parties remains
outside of the contractual realm." 7 1 Therefore, if an obligor were faced
with nonpecuniary damage liability when nonpecuniary interests were
not intended to be served by the contract, unfairness, overdeterrence
and a fundamental inconsistency with the theory of contracts would
result.
Judicial efficiency is also served, in a certain degree, by the legislative
policy limiting nonpecuniary damage recovery to specific contracts. The
limitation relieves the courts from facing nonpecuniary damage claims
in each action for contract breach. Anytime that a contract is not fully
performed, the obligee suffers frustration to some extent. The courts
would be more burdened than they already are if nonpecuniary damages
were allowed each time a breach occurred.
Legislative policy-making of this type is arguably inappropriate in
tort. Policies in tort actions are best served through a case by case
approach. Delictual relationships arise unilaterally, either accidentally
(negligence) or intentionally (intentional torts); these relationships result
from an infinite number of causes (torts). It is impossible to predict
whether such relationships will support recovery for nonpecuniary damages, except, of course, when nonpecuniary damages were intentionally
caused.
With respect to intentionally caused nonpecuniary damages, the Legislature has aligned contractual fault with delictual fault. Article 1998
reads in pertinent part: "Regardless of the nature of the contract, these
damages may be recovered also when the obligor intended, through his
failure, to aggrieve the feelings of the obligee." '7 6 The obligor must not
only intend to breach, but must also intend to aggrieve the obligee's
feelings.7 7 This dual requirement is proper because often a party may,
on business grounds for example, breach a contract, yet not intend to
injure the obligee's feelings. In this situation, the first paragraph of

75.
76.
77.

S. Litvinoff, supra note 61, at 395.
La. Civ. Code art. 1998.
See, e.g., Stipelcovich v. Mike Persia Chevrolet, 391 So. 2d 582 (La. App. 4th

Cir. 1980) (The intentional breach did not give rise to the presumption that the obligor

intended to aggrieve obligee's feelings.).
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article 1998 governs nonpecuniary damage recovery. Interestingly, when
certain activity constitutes both contractual and delictual fault, the obligee is able to take advantage of the longer prescriptive period applicable
7
to contract actions although a delict is involved. 1
In summary, nonpecuniary damages are not awarded in contract
actions "just as they are" in tort actions. The balancing of conflicting
policies present in both tort and contract is functionally different in
both theories in light of the consensual nature of contracts as compared
to the "unilateral" nature of torts. By requiring the cause of the contract
to be the promotion of a nonpecuniary interest, the legislature has served
legitimate policy concerns.
Conclusion
Despite the support in LaFleur for Meador's continued viability,
ample, even substantial, argument exists to discontinue use of the distinction established in Meador between intellectual and physical enjoyment. The court's failure to examine the meaning intended for
"nonpecuniary interest" explains its finding in Lafleur that the language
change of article 1998 was insignificant. The language change, however,
is hardly inconsequential; the revision simplifies the process of applying
article 1998, while broadening the interests protected. Under the proper
interpretation of article 1998, courts no longer need resort to strained
reasoning, conclusory analyses or inappropriate distinctions between contract and tort. The term "nonpecuniary" forces the correct analysis: is
there a noneconomic value which was to be promoted by the contract?
To answer this question, courts must ascertain whether the contract
evidences an intent to gratify nonpecuniary interests as required by article
1998. This entails analysis of the parties' intent by looking to the contract
itself, to the circumstances surrounding its formation, and to communications between the parties during its formation. The question is
answered by a classification of the degree of fault involved in the breach
only when there is an intentional breach. If such a breach is present,
courts must then determine whether the obligor intended to injure the
obligee's feelings by the breach. Although the legislature did a certain
amount of policy balancing, courts should retain a vast amount of
discretion in deciding damage issues. Article 199919 is especially useful
in the nonpecuniary damage realm since, oftentimes, these damages are
not susceptible of exact measurement. Nevertheless, recovery should not

78. La. Civ. Code art. 1998.
79. La. Civ. Code art. 1999 (permitting the court much discretion when damages are
insusceptible of precise measurement).
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be thwarted merely because the damages cannot be calculated with a
high degree of accuracy."'
Nonpecuniary damages need only be proven as any other element
of damage; there is no need to impose an inordinate burden of proof
on plaintiffs. Any doubt as to the exact dollar figure to place on the
damage should be resolved through use of the court's discretionary
powers.
Kathryn Bloomfield

80. The primary objection is that
money. In tort cases, however, this is
contract cases. Difficulty is no reason
Elementaire de Droit Civil No. 252, at

mental suffering can not be compensated with
done every day and should be no different in
for doing nothing at all. 2 M. Planiol, Traite
153 (11th ed. La. State L. Inst. trans. 1959).

